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LAW, NORMS AND AUTHORITY. By George C Christie. London: 
Duckworth. 1982. Pp. x, 181. $29.50. 
In Law, Norms and Authority, Professor Christie attacks the claims of 
many modem legal philosophers who, in his opinion, overstate the legiti-
macy of the western legal systems. According to Christie, claims that law is 
normative and that authority is derived from law are not supportable, and 
by spawning criticism do more to undermine than to bolster respect for law. 
Christie argues that the law is better served by a frank appraisal of its true 
claims to legitimacy: That authority, although de facto, rather than flowing 
from, law, is nevertheless limited by the fact that those in positions of au-
thority rely on the consent of the governed. Consequently, legal decision-
makers must behave with some degree of predictability to generate and pro-
tect the social expectations on which that consent is founded. 
As the author admits, much of Law, Norms and Authority is critical, but 
the criticism is not extraneous. While Christie's insights are interesting in 
their own right, the justification for their inclusion is the foundation his 
criticisms lay for his positive contributions to the philosphy of law. 
Christie's argument that law is not normative, that it does not derive 
from a set of directives that tell people what they ought to do, can be simply 
stated: A theory of norms "presupposes a degree of unity, of completeness, 
of purposiveness and central direction to law" (p. 175) that is simply incon-
sistent with the development of our law. Far from being derived from any 
single source of norms, our law has grown "haphazardly and by accretion" 
(p. 175). This is not to say that law does not have normative force, or that it 
is incapable of guiding human behavior. Rather, the diverse and often con-
flicting values underlying the law as it now exists render the notion of nor-
mative consistency1 of little use in legal decision-making. 
Christie's argument for predictability follows from a model2 for legal 
argumentation which he claims "permits one to make a limited claim of 
objectivity for judicial decision making" (p. 81). This model rests on the 
acceptance of cases and statutes as objective reference points. The cases 
and statutes themselves, not including the cases' "rules of law" or the stat-
utes' legislative histories, serve as undisputed3 premises for legal arguments. 
The statutes are put on a comparable basis by presenting, for each statute, a 
paradigm case - some case to which the statute certainly applies (p. 65). 
Given these objective reference points, objectivity is maintained by re-
quiring that the case in question not be decided differently from the decided 
and paradigm cases, unless there exists a significant difference between the 
instant case and each of the decided and paradigm cases (p. 67). The key to 
1. Here, Christie is responding primarily to the works of Dworkin. Pp. 39-41. See also R. 
DWORKIN, TAKING RIGHTS SERIOUSLY (1977). 
2. The model offered is actually a refinement of the model presented in Christie, Objectivity 
in the Law, 78 YALE L.J. 1311 (1969). 
3. It is undisputed in almost all situations that something either is or is not a case or a 
statute. There need not be any agreement over any "rule of law" found in the case or on an 
interpretation of the statute. 
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maintaining objectivity in such a model is finding an objective way to de-
fine "significant difference." Christie feels that such an objective method 
results when the factual circumstances of the cases, rather than any sup-
posed underlying rules or principles, are the basis for the difference. Judi-
cial decision-making thereby gains objectivity because "disputes about the 
propriety of judicial decisions [are reduced] to disputes about the significant 
factual differences among cases" (p. 69). 
Christie admits that there will be cases involving factual differences 
whose significance is still disputable. Although there will be leeway in deci-
sions in such cases, there is still a requirement that there exist a "plausible 
significant factual difference between [differently decided cases]" (p. 72). 
Christie argues that his model parallels scientific reasoning in that both 
rely on widely accepted standards to evaluate empirical evidence (p. 72). 
But analogous forms ofreasoning may not guarantee the objectivity oflegal 
argumentation. Various philosophers of science have questioned the objec-
tivity of scientific theory,4 and even the possibility of neutral observation 
has been challenged.5 While Christie would probably be happy with 
whatever claim to objectivity science may have, his method does not reach 
even that level. Science might face problems resulting from the effect of 
values on seemingly neutral observations, but the problems involved in ob-
jectively selecting the significant facts from the totality of facts can only be 
greater. 
Quite aside from doubts about the objectivity of science, Christie's ef-
forts to objectify the law would impose serious rigidity on the social order. 
Unlike Dworkin,6 Christie does not put forward a theory of mistakes to 
accommodate changes in values or in our understanding of the facts. He 
thus appears to embrace "the vice known to legal theory as formalism or 
conceptualism."7 Accordingly, the desire to avoid deciding unanticipated 
cases has long served as the primary restraint on the desire for predictabil-
ity. 8 Christie can exalt objectivity only at the expense of flexibility. True, 
he would focus legal arguments on the significant differences between es-
tablished results and cases at bar. But the significance of differences is best 
predicted by the reasons for prior results, which Christie rejects as indeter-
minative. And his system of argument simply has no room for appeals to 
changes in values. One wonders how many additional data points would 
reconfirm the validity of Winterbottom v. Wright9 or Plessy v. Ferguson 10 if 
4. See, e.g., T. KUHN, THE STRUCTURE OF SCIENTIFIC REVOLUTIONS 198 (1970) ("The 
superiority of one theory to another is something that cannot be proved in . . . debate"). 
5. See, e.g., M. POLANYI, PERSONAL KNOWLEDGE 59-62 (1958). 
6. See R. DwORKIN,supra note 1, at 118-23 (1977). Dworkin argues that the right answer 
to a hard case is one that results in the best possible justification for the totality of legal results 
including that of the case to be decided. An outcome consistent with the outcome of prior 
cases is stronger than an outcome that is inconsistent, but in certain instances the precedent 
inconsistent with the correct disposition of the case is so outmoded or unjust that the totality of 
legal results can best be justified by rejecting that precedent and accepting the inconsistency. 
7. H.L.A. HART, THE CONCEPT OF LAW 126 (1961). 
8. See H.L.A. HART, supra note 7, at 126-28; H. Hart & A. Sacks, The Legal Process: 
Basic Problems in the Making and Application of Law 587-97 (unpublished manuscript 1958). 
9. 153 Eng. Rep. 402 (1842). 
IO. 163 U.S. 537 (1896). 
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twentieth-century judges had relied on Christie's method. In fairness, the 
reader should recognize that Christie may not have intended to advance a 
comprehensive theory of judicial decision-making, including constitutional 
cases and those where some precedent is directly attacked. But the cases 
Christie devotes the least consideration to are precisely those where objec-
tivity would do the most to advance the legitimacy of judicial decision-
making. 
Christie's other, and probably greater, contribution is found in his anal-
ysis of authority. He, as is common, distinguishes de jure authority, de facto 
authority and "being an authority," but rejects attempts to reduce other 
forms of authority to de jure authority11 or "being an authority."12 Instead, 
he argues that "all authority is ultimately de facto" (p. 112). 
Christie does not deny that a relation exists between law and authority. 
By "authority," Christie means more than the power to command action; 
authority also involves some claim of right that is accepted by the one to 
whom the command is directed (p. 99). Particularly in the modem nation-
state, where authority is not based solely on the charisma of the person in 
authority, "[authority] is dependent upon law and law is dependent upon 
authority" (p. 138). Perhaps neither could exist in isolation from the other; 
however, "authority is the ultimate source of law rather than law being the 
source of authority" (p. 139). 
Law depends on authority, according to Christie, because it does not 
exist in the abstract. This assertion is in a sense the touchstone of Christie's 
entire argument. Since law does not exist in the abstract, it can be binding 
only if promulgated by authority or backed up by sheer force (pp. 144-45). 
Those in authority owe their positions to the trust of others that they will 
act in accordance with some shared perception of the common good. They 
must continually justify that trust by "consistently . . . trying to work out 
the shared perception of what the public good requires" (p. 146). 
Christie's conclusions that law is based on authority and that all author-
ity is de facto lead to an interesting result. Christie asserts that in describing 
authority it is "pointless to use the terms 'legitimate' or 'illegitimate,' " since 
authority is more basic than law (p. 112). The factual existence of de facto 
authority in an individual may be questioned, but there is no basis on 
which to question the legitimacy of its existence. 
Despite this conclusion, Christie is not prepared to allow unlimited dis-
cretion on the part of the individual in authority. "[C]laims of authority 
... [and] the actual exercise of authority must ... be based upon law as 
much as [they] possibly can" (p. 169). Since authority rests on consent, mis-
use of authority would be self-defeating. 
A parallel to Christie's analysis of authority may be found in noncogni-
tive or emotive theories of ethics. 13 Those theories grew largely out of the 
11. Pp. 91-93 (discussing the theories of Peters and Winch)set'., e.g., Peters,Authority, and 
Winch,Authority, both reprinted in POLlTICAL PHILOSOPHY 83, 97 (A. Quinton ed. 1967). 
12. Pp. 93-94 (discussing the theory of David Bell) See, e.g., Bell, Authority 190 (Royal 
Institute of Philosophy Lectures, 1969-70) (1971). 
13. There are many theories that can be classified as noncognitive or emotive. The brief 
presentation that follows may not be faithful to any one such theory but is an attempt to show 
portions of the various theories that are analogous to the theory presented by Christie. For 
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work of the Vienna Circle oflogical positivists in the 1930s. The positivists 
rejected as meaningless any statements that were not either logically true or 
false or empirically verifiable. Thus, any meaningful statement should be 
subject to logical proof of its truth or falsity or there should be some obser-
vation that would serve to verify or falsify the claim. 
Much of traditional philosophy did not meet the positivists' standard. 
The statements of both metaphysics and ethics are not tautological; nor are 
there observations that bear on their truth. In particular, the statements of 
ethics were found to be meaningless, because goodness and wrongfulness 
are not properties of acts. There is then no observation of an act that will 
verify or falsify a claim that the act is either good or wrong. 
Christie extends the positivists' approach to the philosophy of law. Ob-
servation and logic were basic to the positivists, and since ethical claims 
could not be based on observation or logic, they were meaningless. Christie 
has argued that authority, rather than any overriding system of norms, is 
basic in the philosophy of law. Since authority is de facto, it admits of 
observations, but legitimacy and illegitimacy in any moral sense are not 
observable. Nor may a claim of legitimacy or illegitimacy rest on a legal 
analysis, since authority is more basic than law. 
The emotivists' attempt to find some meaning in ethical statements is 
analogous to the content Christie is willing to find in claims oflegitimacy or 
illegitimacy of authority. The emotivists found content in the statements of 
ethics by viewing them as reports about the speaker's attitude rather than as 
descriptions of the acts involved. Such reports are verifiable to the same 
extent as any other self-reports of mental states and are meaningful. The 
emotivists added a second element, an exhortation to others to act in accord 
with the speaker's attitude, but that aspect is not necessary to a noncogni-
tivist attempt to lend some meaning to ethical claims. Christie's view paral-
lels this approach by allowing a claim that authority is illegitimate only if 
the claim is interpreted as a statement by a person that "he does not like the 
fact that a particular person . . . exercises authority and that, if he were 
one of those to whom these authoritative pronouncements were addressed 
he would not accept them" (p. 102). 
There is, of course, criticism of noncognitive and emotive theories of 
ethics. Cognitive theories argue that there are bases for ethical claims, and 
that the noncognitivists have not captured the meaning of "good" or 
"wrong" in their analysis. Since it does not seem contradictory for an indi-
vidual to say that he sometimes approves of what is wrong, the cognitivist 
concludes that ''wrong" must convey more than an attitude of disapproval. 
Similarly, Christie's conclusions can be criticized for not capturing the 
meaning of "legitimate." 
The criticism has not proven devastating to the noncognitivist and 
should be no more successful against Christie. The noncognitivist rejects 
each of the offered bases for ethical claims and Christie has rejected the 
bases offered for claims of legitmacy or illegitimacy of authority, since any 
more insight into these ethical theories see A. AYER, LANGUAGE, TRUTH AND Lome 102-13 
(2d ed. 1946); C. STEVENSON, ETHICS AND LANGUAGE (1944); Brandt, Emotive Theory of Eth• 
ics, 2 ENCYCLOPEDIA OF PHILOSOPHY 493 (1967); Nielsen, History of Ethics, 3 ENCYCLOPEDIA 
OF PHILOSOPHY 81, 106-07 (1967). 
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greater meaning would be based on norms that would dictate what laws a 
legitimate authority could enact. But if such norms existed, law would be 
normative - a conclusion Christie finds inconsistent with the haphazard 
development of law. 
The willingness of individuals to approve of authority that they do not 
agree with may be explained as the recognition that the individual's own 
attitude is sometimes at odds with what he takes to be the attitude of society 
as a whole. The choices then come down to anarchy, which Christie rejects 
(pp. 112-18), or accepting, in the interest of order, the authority of certain 
people to serve in the role of decision-makers. 14 
The reader who finds noncognitive ethical theories attractive is likely to 
be similarly attracted to Christie's approach to authority and legitimacy. 
The reader who rejects noncognitive ethical theories will probably reject 
Christie's reduction of authority to de facto authority and his dismissal of 
claims of legitimacy. 
14. When the divergence between the individual's own choices and those of the authority 
becomes too great, the individual can seek to replace the authority, by revolution if necessary, 
or resort to civil disobedience. See pp. 138-46 (discussing the views on civil disobedience of 
Dworkin and Thomas Aquinas, among others). 
